PREEMPTIVE TINKERING WITH THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT INVITES BAD KARMA
The Steady State | by Bill Piekney, May 16, 2025
“ The essential qualities of integrity, dedication and grit that lie at the heart of an intelligence professional ultimately may suffer as an unintended consequence of these firings and associated acts. And our senior executives who are making the policies that impact every American’s daily life and futures will be left to fly blind and unconstrained by reality. “
From the beginning of the effort to organize and structure that would become the US Intelligence Community (IC) in 1947, conflict and differences have been routine, sometimes between intelligence agencies, and sometimes between the producers of intelligence and those who consume it. But rarely, if ever, in my fifty-some years of association within and around the IC, has there been a firing of an IC officer over an assessment with which a consumer disagreed. That is not done and should never be done, short of malfeasance, dishonesty or a violation of law or foundational house rules. The recent firing of two senior CIA intelligence officers for having produced intelligence that happens to conflict with this administration’s publicly iterated policy, grossly exceeds long respected professional standards and it likely oversteps the authority of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).
There is a protocol that has developed in practical terms over 78 years of the maturing relationship between intelligence producers and intelligence consumers. This protocol has existed this long with good reason: It offers a structure in which the IC can provide unadulterated intelligence that is useful--sometimes crucial-- to the Executive's decision-making. This intelligence is not an apology for any given policy or objective. It is real-world intelligence provided to the executive to use…or discard…as he/she makes policy decisions.
Many hundreds of Senior Executive Branch officials who are the most important and prized consumers of intelligence, as well as those elected representatives in both the House and the Senate who sit on the powerful Select Committees on Intelligence, regularly and understandably enter office with preconceived notions about international affairs and foreign relationships. Often, these don’t conveniently comport with the intelligence reporting that they’ll be reading over the course of their terms in office.
The intelligence product delivered to these senior consumers by the IC is the result of many experts, multiple sources, highly sensitive and immensely expensive and sophisticated technical systems, a variety of agencies with differing expertise, and then carefully stitched together into a final, examined and re-examined statement. It is not written to “lobby” or represent one policy or another. It offers the facts and analysis of those facts. It is never whimsical although a disagreeable consumer of intelligence, powered by the strength of popular election, is indeed so entitled.
When the IC produces a report that meets with a consumer’s disagreement, that consumer is responsible for choosing to either set it aside or factor it into decisions and actions. Indeed, there are those intelligence reports that are a sock to the proverbial gut, immediately accepted as written (or photographed). They may rock the government establishment or even result in instant alteration to an existing policy or result in military action or planning of some kind. The intelligence officer who delivers a product, be it a Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) or other intelligence report on a topic of interest, explains the assessment, offers supporting data, leaves the paper behind and goes back to their office to get to work. Having fulfilled their responsibility, he/she leaves the executive to fulfill their’s.
The firing of IC officers because an executive doesn’t like to receive news that runs counter to his/her policy objectives is not just a dangerous departure from a protocol designed to support and ensure an honest and constructive policy discussion. Now, even the most seasoned analysts may very understandably think twice about delivering something that might be received with difficulty; younger analysts who are still cutting their teeth on professional standards and learning the subtler tools and merits of their metier may be reluctant to tackle tough analytical decisions.
The reported intention of the Office of the Director of National INtelligence (ODNI) to relocate much of the staff and processing of the PDB from the CIA where it has traditionally been housed, and where it can effectively collaborate and coordinate intelligence issues among a host of US intelligence agencies, risks further erosion of the ability of the intelligence community to provide unvarnished reporting to senior executives. The proposed relocation, even if it were practical under the circumstances, would not likely result in any improvements to the quality or assembly of the intelligence product as it makes its way to the president and other senior consumers. But the relocation of that staff will allow the DNI to impose his or her preemptive approval of any report that the DNI might object to for political reasons or believes higher levels would object to for political reasons.
The action begs the question that the transfer of the production process to the ODNI is designed to ensure intelligence products will not anger a policy official and invite retribution of some kind. Put another way, the change is likely being proposed not to improve the quality, speed and ease of delivery, or rewrite its conclusions for clarity, but to ensure that what ultimately reaches the top consumers is politically “safe”.
The reported move of the preparation of the PDB to the ODNI is not the worst part of this story, nor is the unconscionable firing of two highly respected professional intelligence officer. It is the potential long-term, harmful consequences to US intelligence. There is lasting damage of another kind being done here. Men and women who were before not fearful of delivering bad news assessments to senior consumers may hesitate. In short, our IC may hesitate when it comes to ‘calling’em as they see’em’. The essential qualities of integrity, dedication and grit that lie at the heart of an intelligence professional ultimately may suffer as an unintended consequence of these firings and associated acts. And our senior executives who are making the policies that impact every American’s daily life and futures will be left to fly blind and unconstrained by reality.
Bill Piekney served 4 years in the US Navy, 30 years with the CIA retiring as a Senior Operations Executive, and 5 years as a Senior Consultant at ODNI, International Consultant in Intelligence and National Security. He is a member of The Steady State, an organization of former National security officials
Founded in 2016, The Steady State is a nonpartisan, nonprofit 501(c)(4) organization of more than 270 former senior national security professionals. Our membership includes former officials from the CIA, FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security. Drawing on deep expertise across national security disciplines including intelligence, diplomacy, military affairs and law, we advocate for constitutional democracy, the rule of law and the preservation of America’s national security institutions.