The Future of Counterintelligence in America
The Steady State | by Edward J. Appel, Sr.
In a 28-year career culminating in service as Director of Counterintelligence (CI) programs at the National Security Council’s Intelligence Directorate, I participated in many debates about how to improve U.S. CI operations. Should we have our own internal service akin to the British MI5, a secret CI and counterterrorism agency without arrest or other law enforcement powers? Should we adhere to Harry S. Truman’s warnings about creating our own Gestapo?
U.S. leadership always decided that the FBI, as it has evolved, should remain the primary domestic CI agency. Its CI function is embedded in a criminal investigative organization. Despite occasional weaknesses (e.g., during times when CI was under-resourced and treated as secondary), the Bureau always had major successes in CI. Yes, the KGB did well against the U.S. target during the Cold War. But we won, in no small part due to FBI spy-catchers. When I gave a presentation to the former Soviet and Satellite nations’ security service directors in the late 1990s, I saw a group determined to practice the rule of law in free democracies, for the first time in decades. They modeled their reforms on us.
International law enforcement is a key part of CI. Bribery, fraud, computer crimes, and dozens of other crimes, including countering drug and trafficking cartels, demand strong CI operations integrated with criminal enforcement. The FBI’s unique track record of success in all types of international criminal investigative and intelligence practices should not easily be dismissed. The new leaders of U.S. Intelligence Community agencies would be well advised to learn what has worked before they reinvent the wheel.
Reporting that Tulsi Gabbard is making an effort to move the jurisdiction of CI from the FBI to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence raises the fraught and frightening prospect of a politically-motivated, secret security organization. Such a move represents fundamental changes that challenge old laws and norms, firing competent employees and demanding unquestioning loyalty. Are the new leaders in the Intelligence Community up to the task of improving CI? Do they have any credible experience in running or reforming complex government agencies? Their claims about the “deep state” and political weaponizing are flimsy at best. Indeed, it appears that it is the administration that is doing the weaponizing.
Other democratic nations’ security services in the past conducted secret operations to compromise political party rivals to maintain power. The FBI was not immune to questionable political activity during Nixon’s and Johnson’s terms, but emerged largely unmuddied.
The U.S. should require by law that both the Attorney General and the FBI Director be professionally qualified, nonpartisan leaders exempt from political influence, including political demands from the White House. The President serves all Americans, not a political party.
This administration should consult with past experts and leaders intimately familiar with the discipline of CI past and present, from the Congress, military, FBI and CIA who are not politically-motivated and take their oaths to protect the United States seriously, even in retirement. They are most likely to recommend that the FBI retain its CI jurisdiction.
Edward J. Appel, Sr. served from 1969 to 1997 in the FBI as a Special Agent, Supervisor, Manager and Senior Executive. He specialized in Counterintelligence, taught at FBI Academy in Quantico, supervised a CI/Terrorism squad in San Francisco, conducted Inspections, was the first Agent detailed to National Security Agency, headed an FBIHQ CI analytical unit, served as Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the FBI San Francisco field office and spent over two years as Director of Intelligence Programs for CI, Cryptography, Security and other matters under George Tenet and Rand Beers at the National Security Council, the White House. Afterward, he was security director, consultant, adjunct professor, author of 3 books and private investigator. He is a member of The Steady State.
Founded in 2016, The Steady State is a nonprofit 501(c)(4) organization of more than 360 former senior national security professionals. Our membership includes former officials from the CIA, FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security. Drawing on deep expertise across national security disciplines including intelligence, diplomacy, military affairs and law, we advocate for constitutional democracy, the rule of law and the preservation of America’s national security institutions.
This is a very important article, written by a man with extensive personal experience. Beyond that: anyone who follows the news can see there is a serious problem —- a dangerous situation in our ODNI. I’m still trying to fathom how Congress has approved the nominations of ODNI personnel who have backgrounds of praising the defector Edward Snowden. Who have testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that Jan. 6 was an FBI “false flag” operation! Who have fired professional, non-partisan intelligence analysts for findings that raise questions about Donald Trump’s political agenda. And so much more that one wonders how these key US intelligence officials ever got high-level security clearances in the first place.
Well said! My concern with respect to the recommendations you propose at the end lie with respect to the massive culture change that the current administration has wrought. So I think we should give some thought to the cultural/institutional changes needed before the recommendations that you (with good reason) propose, in order for those recommendations to be effective. I realize this is a heavy lift!